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1. Introduction 
Is a country by definition an optimal currency area? If the optimal number 
of currencies is less than the number of existing countries, which countries 
should  form currency areas? 
This question,  analyzed  in the pioneering  work of Mundell  (1961) and 
extended  in Alesina  and Barro (2002), has jumped  to the center stage of 
the current policy  debate, for several reasons. First, the large increase in 
the number of independent  countries in the world  led, until recently, to 
a roughly one-for-one increase in the number of currencies. This prolifera- 
tion of currencies occurred despite  the growing  integration of the world 
economy.  On  its  own,  the  growth  of  international  trade in  goods  and 
assets should  have raised the transactions benefits from common  curren- 
cies and led, thereby, to a decline in the number of independent  moneys. 
Second, the memory of the inflationary decades of the seventies and eight- 
ies encouraged  inflation  control, thereby generating  consideration  of ir- 
revocably  fixed exchange  rates as a possible  instrument  to achieve price 
stability. Adopting  another country's currency or maintaining  a currency 
board were seen as more credible commitment  devices  than a simple fix- 
ing  of the exchange  rate. Third, recent episodes  of financial turbulence 
have promoted discussions  about "new financial architectures." Although 
this dialogue  is often vague  and inconclusive,  one of its interesting facets 
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is the question  of whether  the one-country-one-currency  dogma  is still 
adequate.1 
Looking around the world,  one sees many examples  of movement  to- 
ward multinational  currencies: twelve  countries in Europe have adopted 
a  single  currency; dollarization  is  being  implemented  in  Ecuador  and 
El Salvador; and dollarization is under active consideration in many other 
Latin American  countries,  including  Mexico,  Guatemala,  and  Peru. Six 
West  African states  have  agreed  to create a new  common  currency for 
the region by 2003, and eleven members of the Southern African Develop- 
ment Community  are debating  whether  to adopt  the dollar or to create 
an independent  monetary  union possibly  anchored to the South African 
rand. Six oil-producing  countries  (Saudi Arabia, United  Arab Emirates, 
Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait) have declared their intention to form 
a currency union by 2010. In addition, several countries have maintained 
currency boards  with  either  the  U.S.  dollar  or the  euro  as  the  anchor. 
Currency boards are, in a sense, midway  between  a system of fixed rates 
and currency union, and the recent adverse experience  of Argentina will 
likely discourage  the use of this approach. 
Currency unions typically take one of two forms. In one, which is most 
common,  client countries (which are usually small) adopt the currency of 
a large anchor country. In the other, a group  of countries creates a new 
currency and a new  joint central bank. The second  arrangement applies 
to the euro zone.2 The Eastern Caribbean Currency Area (ECCA) and the 
CFA zone in Africa are intermediate between  the two types of unions.  In 
both cases, the countries have  a joint currency and a joint central bank.3 
However,  the ECCA currency  (Caribbean dollar) has been  linked  since 
1976 to the U.S. dollar (and, before  that, to the British pound),  and the 
CFA franc has been tied (except for one devaluation)  to the French franc. 
1. In principle,  an optimal  currency  area  could also be smaller  than a country,  that is, more 
than one currency  could circulate  within a country.  However, we have not observed a 
tendency  in this direction. 
2. Some may argue  that the European  Monetary  Union is, in practice,  a German  mark  area, 
but this interpretation  is questionable.  Although  the European  central  bank  may  be partic- 
ularly sensitive to German  preferences,  the composition  of the board and the observed 
policies in its first few years of existence  do not show a German  bias. See Alesina et al. 
(2001). 
3. There  are  actually  two regional  central  banks  in the CFA  zone. One is the BCEAO,  group- 
ing Benin, Burkina  Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea-Bissau,  Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo, 
where  the common  currency is the franc de la Communaute  Financiere  de l'Afrique  or CFA 
franc.  The other is the BEAC,  grouping  Cameroon,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  Re- 
public of Congo, Equatorial  Guinea,  and Gabon,  with the common currency  called the 
franc de la Cooperation  Financiere  Africaine, also  known  as the CFA franc. The two  CFA 
francs  are  legal tender  only in their  respective  regions,  but the two currencies  have main- 
tained a fixed parity. Comoros  issues its own form of CFA franc  but has maintained  a 
fixed parity  with the other two. Optimal Currency  Areas ? 303 
The purpose  of this paper is to evaluate whether natural currency areas 
emerge from an empirical investigation.  As a theoretical background, we 
use  the  framework  developed  by  Alesina  and  Barro (2002), which  dis- 
cusses  the  trade-off between  the costs  and benefits  of currency unions. 
Based on historical  patterns  of international  trade and of comovements 
of prices and outputs,  we  find that there seem  to exist reasonably  well- 
defined dollar and euro areas but no clear yen area. However,  a country's 
decision  to join  a monetary  area should  consider  not just the situation 
that applies ex ante, that is, under monetary autonomy, but also the condi- 
tions that would  apply  ex post, that is, allowing  for the economic  effects 
of currency union. The effects on international trade have been discussed 
in a lively  recent literature prompted  by the findings  of Rose (2000). We 
review  this literature and provide new results. We also find that currency 
unions  tend to increase the comovement  of prices but are not systemati- 
cally related to the comovement  of outputs. 
We should  emphasize  that we do not address other issues  that are im- 
portant for currency adoption,  such as those related to financial markets, 
financial flows, and borrower-lender  relationships.4 We proceed this way 
not  because  we  think  that these  questions  are unimportant,  but  rather 
because  the focus  of the present inquiry is on different issues. 
The paper is organized  as follows.  Section 2 discusses  the broad evolu- 
tion  of country  sizes,  numbers  of currencies, and  currency areas in the 
post-World  War II period. Section 3 reviews  the implications  of the theo- 
retical model  of Alesina  and Barro (2002), which  we  use  as a guide  for 
our empirical investigation.  Section 4 presents our data set. Section 5 uses 
the historical patterns in international trade flows, inflation rates, and the 
comovements  of prices  and  outputs  to attempt  to identify  optimal  cur- 
rency areas. Section 6 considers  how  the formation  of a currency union 
would  change  bilateral trade flows  and the comovements  of prices and 
outputs.  The last section  concludes. 
2. Countries  and Currencies 
In 1947 there were 76 independent  countries in the world, whereas today 
there  are  193. Many  of  today's  countries  are small:  in  1995, 87  coun- 
tries had a population  less than 5 million.  Figure 1, which  is taken from 
Alesina,  Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000), depicts the numbers of countries 
created and eliminated in the last 150 years.5 In the period between  World 
Wars I and  II, international  trade collapsed,  and  international  borders 
4. For a recent theoretical discussion  of these issues,  see Gale and Vives  (2002). 
5. The initial negative  bar in 1870 represents  the unification  of Germany. 304 ? ALESINA, BARRO, & TENREYRO 
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were virtually frozen. In contrast, after the end of World War II, the num- 
ber of countries almost tripled, and the volume  of international trade and 
financial transactions expanded  dramatically. We view  these  two  devel- 
opments  as  interrelated.  First, small  countries  are economically  viable 
when their market is the world, in a free-trade environment. Second, small 
countries  have  an interest  in maintaining  open  borders. Therefore, one 
should  expect  an inverse  correlation between  average  country  size  and 
the degree  of trade openness  and financial integration. 
Figure 2, also taken from Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000), shows 
a strong positive  correlation over the last 150 years between  the detrended 
number of countries in the world and a detrended measure of the volume 
of international trade. These authors show  that this correlation does  not 
just reflect the relabeling of interregional trade as international trade when 
countries  split. In fact, a similar pattern of correlation holds  if one mea- 
sures world trade integration by the volume  of international trade among 
countries that did not change their borders. Alesina  and Spolaore (2002) 
discuss  these issues  in detail and present current and historical evidence 
on the relationship between  country formation and international trade. 
The number of independent  currencies has increased substantially, un- 
til recently almost at the same pace as the number of independent  coun- 
tries. In 1947, there were 65 currencies in circulation, whereas in 2001 there 
were 169. Between 1947 and 2001, the ratio of the number of currencies to 
the number of countries remained roughly constant at about 85%.  Twelve 
of these  currencies, in Europe, have  now  been  replaced by the euro, so 
we  now  have  158 currencies. 
The increase in the number of countries and the deepening  of economic 
integration  should  generate  a tendency  to create multicountry  currency 
areas, unless  one believes  that a country always  defines  the optimal cur- 
rency area. One implication  of Mundell's analysis is that political borders 
and currency boundaries should not always coincide. In fact, as discussed 
in Alesina and Spolaore (2002), small countries can prosper in a world of 
free trade and open financial markets. Nevertheless,  these small countries 
may lack the size  needed  to provide  effectively  some  public  goods  that 
are subject to large economies  of scale or to substantial  externalities.  A 
currency may be one  of these  goods:  a small country  may be too small 
for an independent  money  to be efficient. To put it differently, an ethnic, 
linguistic,  or culturally different group can enjoy political  independence 
by creating its own  country. At the same time, this separate country can 
avoid part of the costs of being economically  small by using  other coun- 
tries to provide  some  public  goods,  such as a currency. 
A country constitutes, by definition, an optimal currency area only if one 
views  a national money as a critical symbol of national pride and identity. Number of Countries 
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However,  sometimes  forms of nationalistic pride have  led countries into 
disastrous  courses of action. Therefore, the argument that a national cur- 
rency satisfies  nationalistic pride  does  not make an independent  money 
economically  or politically  desirable.  In fact, why  a nation  would  take 
pride  in a currency escapes  us; it is probably much  more relevant to be 
proud of an Olympic team. As for national identity, language and culture 
seem much more important than a currency, yet many countries have will- 
ingly  retained  the language  of their former colonizers.  Moreover, many 
countries undergoing  extreme inflation, such as in South America, tended 
to change  the names  of their moneys  frequently,  so  even  a sentimental 
attachment to the name  "peso" or "dollar" seems not to be so important. 
In any event,  as already mentioned,  one can detect a recent tendency 
toward formation of multicountry monetary areas. In the next decade, the 
ratio of currencies to independent  countries  may decrease substantially, 
beginning  with  the adoption  of the euro in 2002. 
3. The  Costs  and Benefits  of Currency  Unions 
We view this analysis from the perspective of a potential client country that 
is considering the adoption of another country's money as a nominal anchor. 
3.1 TRADE  BENEFITS 
Country borders matter for trade flows: two regions of the same country 
trade  much  more  with  each  other  than they  would  if an international 
border were to separate them. McCallum (1995) looked at U.S.-Canadian 
trade in  1988 and  suggested  that this  effect was  extremely  large: trade 
between  Canadian  provinces  was  estimated  to  be  a  staggering  2200% 
larger  than  that  between  otherwise  comparable  provinces  and  states. 
More recent work by Anderson  and van Wincoop  (2001) argues that this 
effect  from the U.S.-Canada  border was  vastly  exaggerated  but  is  still 
substantial: the presence of an international border is estimated to reduce 
trade among  industrialized  countries  by  30%, and between  the United 
States and Canada by 44%. The question  is why  national borders matter 
so  much  for trade even  when  there are no  explicit  trade restrictions  in 
place.  Among  other things,  country  borders  tend  to be associated  with 
different currencies. Therefore, given  that border effects are so large, the 
elimination  of  one  source  of border  costs-the  change  of  currencies- 
might  have  a large effect on trade.6 
Alesina and Barro (2002) investigate  the relationship between  currency 
6. Obstfeld  and Rogoff (2000) argue that these border effects on trade may have profound 
effects on a host of financial markets and may explain a lot of anomalies  in international 
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unions  and trade flows. They model  the adoption  of a common currency 
as a reduction of iceberg trading costs between  two countries. They find 
that, under reasonable  assumptions  about elasticities  of substitution  be- 
tween goods, countries that trade more with each other benefit more from 
adopting  the same currency.7 
Thus,  countries  that trade more  with  each  other stand  to gain  more 
from adopting  the same currency. Also,  smaller countries should,  ceteris 
paribus,  be more inclined to give up their currencies. Hence, as the number 
of countries increases (and their average size shrinks), the number of cur- 
rencies in the world  should  increase less than proportionately.8 
3.2 THE  BENEFITS  OF COMMITMENT 
If an inflation-prone  country adopts  the currency of a credible anchor, it 
eliminates  the inflation-bias  problem  pointed  out by Barro and Gordon 
(1983). This bias may stem from two non-mutually-exclusive  sources: an 
attempt to overstimulate  the economy  in a cyclical context, and the incen- 
tive to monetize  budget  deficits and debts. 
A fixed-exchange-rate system, if totally credible, could achieve the same 
commitment  benefit as a currency union. However,  the recent world his- 
tory shows  that fixed rates are not irrevocably fixed; thus, they lack full 
credibility.  Consequently,  fixed  exchange  rates can create instability  in 
financial markets. To the extent  that a currency union  is more costly  to 
break  than  a promise  to  maintain  a fixed  exchange  rate, the  currency 
adoption  is more credible. In fact, once a country has adopted  a new  cur- 
rency, the costs of turning back are quite high, certainly much higher than 
simply  changing  a fixed  parity to a new  one.  The ongoing  situation  in 
Argentina demonstrates that the government really had created high costs 
for breaking a commitment  associated  with  a currency board and wide- 
spread dollarization of the economy.  However,  the costs were apparently 
not high enough  to deter eventual  reneging  on the commitment. 
A country that abandons  its currency receives  the inflation rate of the 
7. The intuition  for why  this result does  not hold  unambiguously  is the following.  If two 
countries do not trade much with each other initially, the likely reason is that the trading 
costs are high. Hence, the trade that does occur must have a high marginal value. Specifi- 
cally, if the trade occurs in intermediate inputs, then the marginal product of these inputs 
must be high,  because  the trade occurs only  if the marginal product  is at least as high 
as the marginal cost. In this case, the reduction of border costs due to the implementation 
of a currency union would  expand trade in the intermediate goods that have an especially 
high marginal product. Hence, it is possible that the marginal gain from the introduction 
of a currency union would  be greater when  the existing volume  of international trade is 
low. 
8. Alesina  and  Barro (2002) show  that, under  certain conditions,  an even  stronger  result 
holds:  as the number  of countries  increases,  the equilibrium  number  of currencies de- 
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anchor plus the change  (positive  or negative)  in its price level relative to 
that of the anchor. In other words,  if the inflation rate in the United States 
is 2%, then  in Panama  it will  be  2% plus  the change  in relative  prices 
between  Panama  and  the  United  States.  Therefore, even  if the  anchor 
maintains domestic price stability, linkage to the anchor does not guaran- 
tee full price stability for a client country. 
The most  likely  anchors  are large relative  to the  clients.  In theory,  a 
small but very committed country could be a perfectly good anchor. How- 
ever, ex post, a small anchor may be subject to political pressure from the 
large client to abandon  the committed  policy.  From an ex ante perspec- 
tive, this consideration disqualifies  the small country as a credible anchor. 
In summary: The countries that stand to gain the most from giving  up 
their currencies are those that have a history of high and volatile inflation. 
This kind of history is a symptom  of a lack of internal discipline for mone- 
tary policy. Hence, to the extent that this lack of discipline tends to persist, 
such countries would  benefit the most from the introduction  of external 
discipline.  Linkage to another currency is also more attractive if, under 
the linked  system,  relative  price levels  between  the countries  would  be 
relatively  stable. 
3.3 STABILIZATION  POLICIES 
The abandonment  of a separate currency implies  the loss of an indepen- 
dent  monetary  policy.  To the  extent  that monetary  policy  would  have 
contributed to business-cycle  stabilization, the loss of monetary indepen- 
dence  implies  costs in the form of wider  cyclical fluctuations  of output. 
The costs  of giving  up  monetary  independence  are lower  the higher 
the association of shocks between  the client and the anchor. The more the 
shocks  are related,  the  more  the policy  selected  by  the  anchor will  be 
appropriate  for the  client  as well.  What turns  out  to matter is not  the 
correlation of shocks per se, but rather the variance of the client country's 
output expressed  as a ratio to the anchor country's output. This variance 
depends  partly  on the correlation of output  (and, hence,  of underlying 
shocks)  and partly on the individual  variances  of outputs.  For example, 
a small country's output may be highly correlated with that in the United 
States. But, if the small country's variance of output is much greater than 
that of the United States, then the U.S. monetary policy will still be inap- 
propriate  for the  client.  In particular, the magnitude  of  countercyclical 
monetary  policy  chosen  by the United  States will  be too small from the 
client's perspective. 
The costs  implied  by  the loss  of an independent  money  depend  also 
on the explicit  or implicit  contract that can be arranged between  the an- 
chor and its clients. We can think of two  cases.  In one, the anchor does 310 *  ALESINA,  BARRO,  & TENREYRO 
not change its monetary policy regardless of the composition  and experi- 
ence of its clients. Thus, clients that have  more shocks  in common  with 
the anchor stand to lose  less  from abandoning  their independent  policy 
but have no influence on the monetary policy chosen by the anchor coun- 
try. In the other case, the clients can compensate  the anchor to motivate 
the selection of a policy that takes into account the clients' interests, which 
will reflect the shocks that they experience. The ability to enter into such 
contracts makes  currency unions  more attractive. However,  even  when 
these  agreements  are feasible,  the greater the  association  of shocks  be- 
tween  clients and anchor, the easier it is to form a currency union.  Spe- 
cifically, it is cheaper for a client to buy accommodation  from an anchor 
that faces shocks that are similar to those faced by the clients.9 The alloca- 
tion of seignorage  arising from the client's  use  of the anchor's currency 
can be made  part of the compensation  schemes. 
The European Monetary Union is similar to this arrangement with com- 
pensation,  because  the monetary policy  of the union  is not targeted to a 
specific country (say Germany), but rather to a weighted  average of each 
country's shocks, that is, to aggregate euro-area shocks. In the discussion 
leading  up to the formation  of the European Monetary Union,  concerns 
about  the  degree  of association  among  business  cycles  across potential 
members were critical. In practice, the institutional  arrangements within 
the  European  Union  are  much  more  complex  than  a  compensation 
scheme,  but the point  is that the ECB does  not target the shocks  of any 
particular country, but rather the average European shocks.10 
In the case of developing  countries, the costs of abandoning an indepen- 
dent monetary policy may not be that high, because stabilization policies 
are typically not well used when exchange rates are flexible. Recent work 
by Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Hausmann,  Panizza,  and Stein (1999) 
suggests  that developing  countries  tend  to follow  procyclical  monetary 
policies; specifically,  they tend to raise interest rates in times of distress 
to defend the value of their currency.1 To the extent that monetary policy 
is not properly  used  as a stabilization  device,  the loss  of monetary  in- 
dependence  is not a substantial  cost (and may actually be a benefit) for 
9. Note  that, in theory, a small  country  could  be an ideal  anchor because  it is cheaper to 
compensate  such  an anchor for the provision  of monetary  services  that are tailored  to 
the interests of clients. However,  as discussed  before, a small anchor may lack credibility. 
10. The European Union  also has specific prescriptions  about the allocation of seignorage. 
The amounts are divided  according to the share of GDP of the various member countries. 
For a discussion  of the European  Central Bank policy  objectives  and how  this policy 
relates to individual  country shocks,  see Alesina  et al. (2001). 
11. A literature on Latin America, prompted mostly by a paper by Gavin and Perotti (1997), 
has also shown  that fiscal policy  has the wrong  cyclical properties.  That is, surpluses 
tend to appear during  recessions,  and deficits during  expansions. Optimal  Currency  Areas  *  311 
developing  countries. However,  recent work by Broda (2001) shows  that 
countries  with  floating-exchange-rate  systems  show  superior  perfor- 
mance  in the face of terms-of-trade  shocks.  This pattern may reflect the 
benefits  from independent  monetary  policies. 
To summarize,  the countries that have the largest comovements  of out- 
puts  and prices with potential  anchors are those with  the lowest  costs of 
abandoning  monetary  independence. 
3.4 TRADE,  GEOGRAPHY,  AND COMOVEMENTS 
Countries that trade more can benefit more from currency unions  for the 
reasons  already  discussed.  Increased  trade may  also  raise the comove- 
ments  of outputs  and prices. In this case, there is a second  reason why 
countries that trade more would  have a greater net benefit from adopting 
a currency union. 
An established literature on the gravity model of trade shows  that bilat- 
eral trade volumes  are well  explained  by a set of geographical  and eco- 
nomic variables, such as the distance between  the countries and the sizes 
and  incomes  of  the  countries.  Note  that the  term  "distance" has  to be 
interpreted broadly to include  not only literal geographical  distance, but 
also whether  the countries  share a common  language,  legal system,  and 
so on. In addition,  some  geographical  variables  may influence  comove- 
ments of outputs and prices beyond  their effects through trade. For exam- 
ple,  locational  proximity  and weather  patterns may relate to the nature 
of underlying  shocks, which  in turn influence  the comovements. 
Whether more trade always  means more comovements  of outputs and 
prices is not a settled  issue.  On the theoretical side, the answer depends 
largely  on whether  trade is interindustry  or intraindustry.  In the latter 
case, more trade likely leads to more comovements.  However,  in the for- 
mer  case,  increased  trade  may  stimulate  sectoral  specialization  across 
countries.  This heightened  specialization  likely lowers  the comovements 
of outputs  and prices, because  industry-specific  shocks become  country- 
specific  shocks.12 The type  of trade between  two  countries  is also likely 
influenced  by  the levels  of per  capita GDP; for example,  intraindustry 
trade tends  to be much more important for rich countries. 
In summary, geographical or gravity variables affect bilateral trade and, 
as a result, the costs and benefits of currency unions.  Some geographical 
variables may have an effect on the attractiveness of currency unions be- 
yond  those  operating  through  the trade channel. 
12. See Frankel and Rose (1998) for the argument  that more trade favors more correlated 
business  cycles. See Krugman (1993) for the opposite  argument. For an extensive theoret- 
ical and empirical discussion  of these issues, see Ozcan, Sorensen, and Yosha (2001, 2002) 
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4.  Data and Methodology 
4.1  DATA DESCRIPTION AND  SOURCES 
Data on outputs and prices come from the World Bank's World Develop- 
ment  Indicators  (WDI)  and  Penn  World  Tables  5.6.  Combining  both 
sources,  we  form a panel  of countries  with  yearly  data on outputs  and 
prices from 1960 to 1997 (or, in some cases, for shorter periods).  For out- 
put, we  use real per capita GDP expressed  in 1995 U.S. dollars. To com- 
pute  relative prices, we  use  a form of real exchange  rate relating to the 
price level  for gross  domestic  products.  The measure  is the purchasing- 
power  parity (PPP) for GDP divided  by the U.S. dollar exchange  rate.13 
In the  first instance,  this  measure  gives  us  the price  level  in country  i 
relative  to that in the United  States, Pi,t/Pust.  We then compute  relative 
prices between  countries  i and j by  dividing  the value  for country  i by 
that for country j. Inflation is computed  as the continuously  compounded 
(log-difference)  growth  rate of the GDP deflator, coming  from WDI. 
Bilateral trade information comes  from Glick and Rose (2002), who  in 
turn extracted it from the International Monetary Fund's Direction  of Trade 
Statistics. These data are expressed  in real U.S. dollars.'4 
To compute  bilateral distances,  we  use  the great-circle-distance  algo- 
rithm provided  by Gray (2002). Data on location,  as well  as contiguity, 
access to water, language,  and colonial relationships  come from the CIA 
World  Fact Book  2001. Data on free-trade agreements come from Glick and 
Rose (2002) and are complemented  with data from the World Trade Orga- 
nization  Web page. 
4.2 THE  COMPUTATION  OF COMOVEMENTS 
We  pair  all  countries  and  calculate  bilateral  relative  prices,  Pi / Pj. 
(This ratio measures  the  value  of  one  unit  of  country  i's output  rela- 
tive  to one  unit of country j's  output.)  This procedure  generates  21,321 
(207 x  206/2)  country  pairs for each year. For every  pair of countries, 
(i, j),  we  use  the  annual  time  series  {ln(Pit/P,j)}t97  to  compute  the 
second-order  autoregression15: 
13. Pi = (PPP of GDP) / (ex. rate) measures how many units of U.S. output can be purchased 
with  one unit of country i's output,  that is, it measures  the relative price of country i's 
output  with  respect  to that of the United  States. By definition,  this price  is always  1 
when  i is the United  States. 
14. Glick and Rose (2002) deflated the original nominal values of trade by the U.S. consumer 
price index,  with  1982-1984  =  100. We use  the same index  to express  trade values  in 
1995 U.S. dollars. 
15. We use fewer observations  when  the full time series from 1960 to 1997 is unavailable. 
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In Pit =  bo +  bl  n  +  b  n  +  etij 
Pjt  Pj,t-1  Pij,t-2 
The estimated  residual,  t,i,j, measures  the relative  price that would  not 
be predictable  from the two  prior values  of relative prices. We then use 
as a measure  of (lack of)  comovement  of relative prices the root-mean- 
square error: 
fp^/  1  T 
VP,1  \IT-3 
t 
The lower  VPij,  the greater the comovement  of prices between  countries 
i and j. 
We proceed analogously  to compute a measure of output comovement. 
The value  of  VYij  comes  from the estimated  residuals  from the second- 
order autoregression  on annual data for relative per capita GDP: 
In  Yi  =  Co +  C1  In  +  C2  In  Y  +  utij. 
Yjt  Yj,t-l  Yj,t-2 
The  estimated  residual  utij measures  the  relative  output  that  would  not 
be predictable from the two prior values  of relative output. We then use 
as a measure of (lack of) comovement  of relative outputs  the root-mean- 
square error: 
1T 
VYij  t  -3  Ui 
t=l 
The lower VYii,  the greater the comovement  of outputs between  countries 
i and j. 
For most  countries  all of the data are available.  We exclude  from the 
computation  of comovements  country pairs for which  we do not have at 
least 20 observations.  Note  that this limitation implies  that we cannot in- 
clude in our analysis most of central and eastern Europe, a region in which 
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5.  Which Currency  Areas? 
In this section, we  sketch "natural" currency areas, based  on the criteria 
discussed  above. For anchor currencies, we  consider  the U.S. dollar, the 
euro, and the yen. We are not assuming  that all countries have to belong 
to one of the unions centered around these three currencies. In fact, many 
countries turn out not to be good clients for any of the anchors and seem 
to be better off keeping  their own currency. Therefore, we are addressing 
the question  of which  countries would  be better served by joining some 
currency union, as well as the question of which anchor should be chosen 
if one is needed. 
5.1 INFLATION,  TRADE,  AND COMOVEMENTS 
We begin in Table 1 by showing  the average inflation rate, using the GDP 
deflator, for selected  countries  and  groups  in our sample  from 1970 to 
1990. We stopped  at 1990 because in the 1990s several countries adopted 
currency arrangements, such as the EMS, that contributed to reduced  in- 
flation.  We  are interested  here  mostly  in  capturing  inflation  rates that 
would  arise in the absence of a monetary anchor. We take the 1970s and 
1980s (that is,  after Bretton Woods  and before  the  recent emphasis  on 
nominal  anchors) as a period with few true monetary anchors. We show 
the 20 countries with  the highest  average inflation  rates, along with  the 
averages  for industrialized  countries  and  for regional  groups  of devel- 
oping  countries. 
The top average rates of inflation are all Latin American countries, and 
7 Latin American  countries  are in the  top  11. The top  5 countries  had 
an average  annual inflation rate above  280%. Despite  its poor economic 
performance in other dimensions,  Africa does not have a very high aver- 
age inflation rate. While there are 6 African countries  in the top 20, the 
average  for the continent  is brought  down  by the countries  in the CFA 
franc zone, which  have relatively low  inflation records. The Middle  East 
is the second highest inflation group, with two countries, Israel and Leba- 
non,  in the top  13 with  inflation rates of 78% and 44%, respectively.  In 
the euro zone, Greece and Italy lead in the rankings, with inflation rates 
of 16% and  13%, respectively.  Overall,  11 countries  had an average  an- 
nual inflation rate above 50%, 30 countries above  20%, and 72 countries 
above  10%. 
Table 2 shows  inflation variability  and is organized  in the same  way 
as Table 1. Since average  inflation and  inflation variability  are strongly 
positively  correlated, 16 of the top 20 countries in Table 1 are also in the 
top 20 of Table 2. However,  in some cases, such as Chile, the high average 
inflation rate (107%) reflected one episode  of hyperinflation  followed  by 
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Table 1  MEAN ANNUAL INFLATION 
RATE  1970-1990a 
Region  Rate  (%/yr) 
High-Inflation  Countriesb 
Nicaragua  1168 
Bolivia  702 
Peru  531 
Argentina  431 
Brazil  288 
Vietnam  213 
Uganda  107 
Chile  107 
Cambodia  80 
Israel  78 
Uruguay  62 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  49 
Lebanon  44 
Lao PDR  42 
Mexico  41 
Mozambique  41 
Somalia  40 
Turkey  39 
Ghana  39 
Sierra  Leone  34 
All 
Industrial  Countriesc 












aBased on GDP  deflators.  Source:  WDI  2001. 
b  This  group  includes  only countries  with 1997  population 
above 500,000.  Ranked  by inflation  rate. 
c  Unweighted  means. 
flation rate (22%) resulted  from a long  period  of moderate,  double-digit 
inflation. 
Tables 3, 4, and  5 list  for selected  countries  and  groups  the  average 
trade-to-GDP ratios16  over 1960-1997 with three potential anchors for cur- 
rency areas: the United  States, the euro area (based on the twelve  mem- 
16. The trade measure is equivalent  to the average of imports and exports. Glick and Rose's 
(2002) values  come from averaging four measures of bilateral trade (as reported for im- 
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Table 2  INFLATION-RATE VARIABILITY 
1970-1990a 
Region  Variability  (%/yr) 
Countries with  High Inflation  Variabilityb 
Nicaragua  3197 
Bolivia  2684 
Peru  1575 
Argentina  749 
Brazil  589 
Chile  170 
Vietnam  160 
Israel  95 
Cambodia  63 
Uganda  63 
Mozambique  52 
Somalia  50 
Oman  46 
Lebanon  41 
Kuwait  38 
Uruguay  38 
Guinea-Bissau  37 
Mexico  37 
Guyana  36 
Congo,  Dem. Rep  36 
Industrial  Countriesc 
All  4.6 
Developing  Countriesc 
Africa  13.9 
Asia  14.0 
Europe  6.6 
Middle  East  28.4 
Western Hemisphere  251.2 
a Standard  deviation of annual inflation  rates, based on 
GDP  deflators.  Source:  WDI  2001. 
b  This  group  includes  only countries  with 1997  population 
above 500,000.  Ranked  by standard  deviation  of inflation. 
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Table 3  AVERAGE TRADE-TO-GDP 
RATIO WITH THE UNITED 
STATES, 1960-1997a 
Region  Ratio (%) 
High-Trade-Ratio  Countriesb 
Trinidad and Tobago  29.6 
Honduras  24.3 
Guyana  23.0 
Jamaica  19.4 
Angola  19.0 
Canada  18.3 
Dominican  Republic  16.8 
Nigeria  15.0 
Singapore  13.2 
Panama  12.2 
Nicaragua  12.1 
Venezuela  11.7 
Costa Rica  11.3 
Hong  Kong  11.0 
Ecuador  9.9 
Haiti  9.6 
Mexico  8.7 
Gabon  8.0 
Congo,  Rep.  7.9 
Guatemala  7.5 
Industrial  Countriesc 
All  2.5 
Developing  Countriesc 
Africa  3.3 
Asia  3.7 
Europe  0.8 
Middle  East  4.2 
Western Hemisphere  12.9 
a  Trade is the average of imports and exports. (Im- 
ports is the average  of the values  reported by the 
importer and the exporter. Idem for exports.) Av- 
erages are for 1960-1997  (when GDP data are not 
available,  the  average  corresponds  to  the period 
of  availability).  The  equations  for  comovement 
include  only  one  observation  for each  pair,  cor- 
responding  to the period  1960-1997.  The explana- 
tory  variables  then  refer  to  averages  over  time. 
Source: Glick and  Rose  (trade values;  WDI 2001 
(GDP). 
bThis  group  includes  only  countries  with  1997 
population  above 500,000. 
c 
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Table 4  AVERAGE TRADE-TO-GDP 
RATIO WITH THE EURO 
12, 1960-1997a 
Region  Ratio (%) 
High Trade-Ratio  Countriesb 
Mauritania  34.8 
Congo,  Rep.  28.3 
Guinea-Bissau  27.5 
Cote d'Ivoire  24.5 
Algeria  24.4 
Belgium-Lux.  23.4 
Gabon  23.0 
Togo  22.9 
Nigeria  22.8 
Tunisia  20.9 
Gambia, The  20.6 
Senegal  20.4 
Comoros  19.3 
Netherlands  18.2 
Oman  17.7 
Cameroon  17.3 
Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  17.0 
Slovenia  16.9 
Angola  15.6 
Syrian Arab Republic  15.2 
Industrial  Countriesc 
All  7.3 
Developing  Countriesc 
Africa  14.2 
Asia  4.3 
Europe  7.0 
Middle  East  11.6 
Western Hemisphere  8.3 
aTrade is the average  of imports  and exports.  (Im- 
ports is the average  of the values reported  by the 
importer  and the exporter.  Idem for exports.)  Av- 
erages  are for 1960-1977  (when GDP  data  are not 
available,  the average  corresponds  to the period  of 
availability).  Source:  Glick  & Rose (trade  values); 
WDI  2001  (GDP).  For  a Euro  12 country,  the trade 
ratios  apply to the other 11 countries. 
b This  group  includes  only  countries  with  1997 
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Table 5  AVERAGE TRADE-TO-GDP 
RATIO WITH JAPAN, 
1960-1997a 
Region  Ratio (%) 
High-Trade-Ratio  Countriesb 
Oman  16.0 
United  Arab Emirates  15.7 
Panama  14.1 
Singapore  12.8 
Kuwait  9.5 
Malaysia  9.5 
Papua New  Guinea  9.2 
Bahrain  8.4 
Saudi Arabia  8.0 
Hong  Kong, China  7.9 
Indonesia  7.8 
Swaziland  6.5 
Thailand  5.6 
Gambia, The  5.5 
Mauritania  5.4 
Iran, Islamic Rep.  5.4 
Philippines  4.8 
Korea, Rep.  4.1 
Nicaragua  3.9 
Fiji  3.7 
Industrial  Countriesc 
All  0.8 
Developing  Countriesc 
Africa  1.4 
Asia  5.5 
Europe  0.3 
Middle  East  6.1 
Western Hemisphere  2.0 
a  Trade is the average of imports and exports. (Im- 
ports is the average of the values  reported by the 
importer and the exporter. Idem for exports.) Av- 
erages are for 1960-1997  (when GDP data are not 
available, the average corresponds  to the period of 
availability). Source: Glick and Rose (trade values); 
WDI 2001 (GDP). 
bThis  group  includes  only  countries  with  1997 
population  above 500,000. 
c 
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bers), and Japan. The GDP value in the denominator  of these ratios refers 
to the country paired with  the potential  anchor. 
The  tables  show  that Japan is  an  economy  that  is  relatively  closed; 
moreover,  in comparison  with  the United  States and the euro region, Ja- 
pan's  trade is more dispersed  across partners. Hence,  few  countries  ex- 
hibit a high trade-to-GDP ratio with Japan. Notably,  industrial countries' 
average  trade share with  Japan is below  1%. Among  developing  coun- 
tries, oil exporters have a high trade share with Japan, but still below  that 
with the Euro 12. Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Indonesia exhibit 
relatively high trade-to-GDP ratios with Japan (above 7%),  but Singapore 
and Hong  Kong trade even more with  the United  States. For the United 
States, aside  from Hong  Kong  and  Singapore,  a good  portion  of  Latin 
America has a high ratio of trade to GDP. Canada is notable for trading 
almost exclusively  with the United States; its trade ratio is 18%,  compared 
with  1.7% for the Euro 12 and 1.4% for Japan. African countries, broadly 
speaking,  trade significantly  more with  Europe, but some  of them, such 
as Angola  and Nigeria,  are also closely  linked with  the United  States. 
Tables 6, 7, and 8 report our measures  of the comovements  of prices 
for selected countries with the United States, the Euro 12 area, and Japan.17 
Remember  that a larger number  means  less  comovement.  Panama and 
Puerto Rico, which  use the U.S. dollar, have the highest comovements  of 
prices  with  the United  States. These  two  are followed  by  Canada  and 
El Salvador, which  has recently dollarized.  Members of the OECD have 
fairly  high  price  comovements  with  all  three  of  the  potential  anchors 
(which  are themselves  members  of the OECD). For Japan, the countries 
that are most  closely  related in terms of price comovements  lack a clear 
geographical  distribution.  For the Euro 12, the euro members  and other 
western  European  countries  have  a high  degree  of  price  comovement. 
African countries  also have  relatively  high price comovements  with  the 
Euro 12, higher than that with  the United  States. 
Tables 9, 10, and 11 report our measures of the comovements  of outputs 
(per capita GDPs) for selected  countries with the United  States, the Euro 
12 area, and Japan.18  The general picture is reasonably similar to that for 
prices. Note  that all of the OECD countries  have  relatively  high  output 
comovements  with  the three anchors, particularly with  the Euro 12. Ja- 
pan's business  cycle seems  to be somewhat  less associated  with  the rest 
of the world: even  developing  countries in Asia tend to exhibit, on aver- 
age, higher output comovements  with  the Euro 12. The regional patterns 
17. Recall that we  compute  comovements  only for pairs of countries  for which  we have at 
least 20 annual observations. 
18. As  for  prices,  we  consider  only  pairs  of  countries  for  which  we  have  at  least  20 
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Table 6  COMOVEMENT OF PRICES 
WITH THE UNITED 
STATES, 1960-1997a 
Region  VP 
High-Comovement  Countriesb 
Puerto Rico  0.0193 
Panama  0.0244 
Canada  0.0335 
El Salvador  0.0340 
Singapore  0.0444 
Thailand  0.0529 
Guinea  0.0545 
Bahrain  0.0563 
Hong  Kong, China  0.0566 
Honduras  0.0571 
Malaysia  0.0609 
Saudi Arabia  0.0646 
Australia  0.0664 
Fiji  0.0666 
Hungary  0.0673 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.0681 
Cyprus  0.0687 
Tunisia  0.0689 
New  Zealand  0.0691 
Norway  0.0671 
Industrial  Countriesc 
All  0.0830 
Developing  Countriesc 
Africa  0.1445 
Asia  0.0913 
Europe  0.1107 
Middle  East  0.1348 
Western Hemisphere  0.1040 
a The  table  shows the value VP,  the standard  error 
of the residual  for the AR(2)  regression  for the log 
of the real  exchange  rate.  In  some cases,  the sample 
differs  from 1960-1997. 
bThis group includes only countries with 1997 
population  above 500,000.  c  Unweighted  means. 322 * ALESINA, BARRO, & TENREYRO 
Table 7  COMOVEMENT OF PRICES 
WITH THE EURO 12, 
1960-1997a 
Region  VP 
High-Comovement  Countriesb 
Austria  0.0196 
Netherlands  0.0217 
Denmark  0.0219 
Belgium  0.0242 
Germany  0.0328 
France  0.0338 
Norway  0.0363 
Switzerland  0.0395 
Ireland  0.0397 
Morocco  0.0426 
Italy  0.0478 
Portugal  0.0480 
Sweden  0.0489 
Spain  0.0491 
Greece  0.0510 
Tunisia  0.0529 
Cyprus  0.0536 
Finland  0.0552 
United  Kingdom  0.0616 
New  Zealand  0.0678 
Industrial  Countriesc 
All  0.0507 
Developing  Countriesc 
Africa  0.1403 
Asia  0.1103 
Europe  0.1152 
Middle  East  0.1607 
Western Hemisphere  0.1350 
aThe  table shows  the value of VP, the standard er- 
ror of  the residual  for the ARC(2) regression  for 
the log of the real exchange  rate. For a member of 
the Euro 12, the comovement  is in relation to the 
other 11 countries.  In some  cases, the sample  dif- 
fers from 1960-1997. 
b  This  group  includes  only  countries  with  1997 
population  above 500,000. 
c Unweighted  means. Optimal Currency  Areas * 323 
Table 8  COMOVEMENT OF PRICES 
WITH JAPAN, 1960-1997a 
Region  VP 
High-Comovement  Countriesb 
Switzerland  0.0713 
Austria  0.0719 
Germany  0.0776 
New  Zealand  0.0791 
Netherlands  0.0805 
Denmark  0.0810 
Belgium  0.0816 
Papua New  Guinea  0.0827 
Thailand  0.0841 
Cyprus  0.0845 
Singapore  0.0866 
France  0.0883 
Norway  0.0883 
Morocco  0.0918 
United  States  0.0924 
Australia  0.0940 
Panama  0.0944 
Malaysia  0.0947 
Tunisia  0.0960 
Puerto Rico  0.0961 
Industrial  Countriesc 
All  0.0919 
Developing  Countriesc 
Africa  0.1647 
Asia  0.1237 
Europe  0.1307 
Middle  East  0.1730 
Western Hemisphere  0.1465 
a  The table shows  the value of VP, the standard er- 
ror of the residual for the AR(2) regression for the 
log  of  the real exchange  rate. In some  cases,  the 
sample  differs from 1960-1997. 
bThis  group  includes  only  countries  with  1997 
population  above 500,000. 
c 
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Table 9  COMOVEMENT OF 
OUTPUTS WITH THE 
UNITED STATES, 
1960-1997a 
Region  VY 
High-Comovement  Countriesb 
Canada  0.0135 
United  Kingdom  0.0150 
Australia  0.0175 
Germany  0.0196 
Netherlands  0.0197 
France  0.0200 
Colombia  0.0205 
Puerto Rico  0.0216 
Denmark  0.0217 
Norway  0.0224 
Italy  0.0230 
Spain  0.0238 
Honduras  0.0251 
Belgium  0.0253 
Sweden  0.0254 
Switzerland  0.0256 
Costa Rica  0.0258 
Austria  0.0261 
Japan  0.0265 
Guatemala  0.0265 
Industrial  Countriesc 
All  0.0251 
Developing  Countriesc 
Africa  0.0591 
Asia  0.0524 
Europe  0.0449 
Middle  East  0.0749 
Western Hemisphere  0.0442 
The  table  shows the value of VY,  the standard  er- 
ror  of the residual  for the AR(2)  regression  for the 
log of the ratio of real per capita  GDPs.  In some 
cases,  the sample  differs  from 1960-1997. 
b  This group includes only countries with 1997 
population  above 500,000.  c  Unweighted  means. Optimal Currency  Areas * 325 
Table 10  COMOVEMENT OF 
OUTPUTS WITH THE 
EURO 12, 1960-1997a 
Region  VY 
High-Comovement  Countriesb 
France  0.0094 
Belgium  0.0108 
Netherlands  0.0116 
Austria  0.0131 
Colombia  0.0145 
Italy  0.0154 
Germany  0.0154 
Sweden  0.0165 
Spain  0.0165 
Switzerland  0.0168 
United  Kingdom  0.0170 
Denmark  0.0177 
United  States  0.0185 
Canada  0.0187 
Japan  0.0202 
Puerto Rico  0.0205 
Norway  0.0210 
Guatemala  0.0220 
Australia  0.0222 
Cyprus  0.0227 
Industrial  Countriesc 
All 
Developing  Countriesc 
0.0198 
Africa  0.0557 
Asia  0.0500 
Europe  0.0421 
Middle  East  0.0713 
Western Hemisphere  0.0426 
a  The table shows  the value of VY, the standard er- 
ror of the residual for the AR(2) regression for the 
log  of the ratio of real per capita GDPs.  In some 
cases,  the  sample  differs  from  1960-1997.  For a 
member of the Euro 12, the comovement  is in rela- 
tion to the other 11 countries. 
bThis  group  includes  only  countries  with  1997 
population  above 500,000. 
c 
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Table 11  COMOVEMENT OF 
OUTPUTS WITH JAPAN, 
1960-1997a 
Region  VY 
High-Comovement  Countriesb 
France  0.0214 
United  Kingdom  0.0217 
Germany  0.0229 
Austria  0.0234 
Netherlands  0.0235 
Italy  0.0236 
Belgium  0.0243 
Colombia  0.0252 
Australia  0.0254 
Sweden  0.0256 
Greece  0.0260 
Switzerland  0.0262 
Puerto Rico  0.0262 
Denmark  0.0265 
United  States  0.0265 
Sri Lanka  0.0271 
Spain  0.0272 
Thailand  0.0282 
Cyprus  0.0286 
Canada  0.0296 
All 
Industrial  Countriesc 
Developing  Countriesc 
0.0282 
Africa  0.0596 
Asia  0.0541 
Europe  0.0443 
Middle  East  0.0748 
Western Hemisphere  0.0463 
a  The table shows  the value of VY, the standard er- 
ror of the residual for the AR(2) regression for the 
log  of the ratio of real per capita GDPs.  In some 
cases, the sample  differs from 1960-1997. 
bThis  group  includes  only  countries  with  1997 
population  above  500,000. 
c 
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show  that Africa is generally more associated  with  the Euro 12, whereas 
there is more ambiguity  for Latin America. 
Overall, Japan is a worse  anchor than the United  States and the Euro 
12, in that fewer countries are associated  with Japan in price and output 
comovements,  and trade flows  to Japan are more dispersed  across part- 
ners. Africa is more associated in price and output comovements  with the 
Euro 12 than with  the United  States, and Africa also  trades more  with 
the euro zone. North America is highly associated with the United States. 
As  for Latin America,  this  region  trades  overall  more  with  the United 
States than with the euro zone or Japan. However,  comovements  of prices 
and outputs  for this region  are not much  higher with  the United  States 
than they  are with  the Euro 12. An interesting  case is Argentina.  In co- 
movements  of prices and outputs,  Argentina is more associated  with  the 
euro area than with  the United  States. Mexico, in contrast, is much more 
associated  in its price and output  comovements  with  the United  States. 
In Asia, Hong  Kong and Singapore are more associated  with  the United 
States than with Japan. 
Looking  at the tables, the patterns  of trade and price and  output  co- 
movements  suggest  geographically  connected  areas that are linked to the 
U.S. dollar (North and part of South America) and the euro (Europe and 
Africa). For Japan, at most  a small part of east Asia seems  to apply. 
5.2 WHICH  CURRENCY  UNIONS? 
This  subsection  brings  together  the  data  already  presented  to  discuss 
which currency unions  appear most attractive in terms of the criteria sug- 
gested  by the underlying  theory. The natural clients, with  respect to the 
three proposed  anchors, are those countries that have no ability to commit 
to low inflation (as evidenced  by a history of high and variable inflation), 
that trade a lot (at least potentially)  with  the anchor, and that have high 
price and output comovements  with the anchor. The implicit assumption 
here is that the patterns  for trade and comovements  that apply  ex ante 
(under monetary  autonomy)  would  also apply at least in a relative sense 
ex post  (under a currency union). 
We begin  in Table 12 by  listing  the 28 countries  in our sample  with 
average  inflation  rates of at least  15% per year from 1970 to  1990.19  We 
suggest  that these countries are likely to have a high demand for an exter- 
nal nominal  anchor because  of their evident  lack of commitment  to low 
inflation. We then list for these countries their trade shares and measures 
of price and output  comovements  with  the three potential  anchors. 
19. We restrict this analysis  to countries  with populations  larger than 500,000 in 1997. The 
analysis  is also  constrained  by  data availability: only  countries  with  data on comove- 
ments  of output  and prices are considered. Table 12  HIGH-INFLATION COUNTRIESa:  TRADE RATIOS AND  COMOVEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES, 
THE EURO 12, AND  JAPAN 
Mean  Trade  Trade  Trade 
annual  ratio  ratio  ratio 
inflation  with  with  with  VP with  VP with  VP with  VY with  VY with  VY with 













1168  0.121  0.079  0.039  0.521 
702  0.053  0.032  0.014  0.105 
531  0.035  0.024  0.011  0.135 
431  0.009  0.017  0.003  0.255 
288  0.015  0.015  0.004  0.122 
107  0.047  0.051  0.021  0.116 
78  0.052  0.069  0.007  0.092 
62  0.014  0.027  0.002  0.158 
49  0.033  0.170  0.010  0.170 
41  0.087  0.013  0.006  0.111 
39  0.011  0.046  0.003  0.116 













0.551  0.078  0.077 
0.150  0.043  0.043 
0.157  0.057  0.055 
0.251  0.060  0.056 
0.155  0.042  0.035 
0.140  0.050  0.052 
0.124  0.038  0.032 
0.174  0.038  0.038 
0.179  0.054  0.052 
0.165  0.036  0.036 
0.138  0.036  0.038 
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0.049  0.123  0.025  0.207 
0.014  0.275  0.018  0.156 
0.099  0.043  0.017  0.072 
0.045  0.027  0.006  0.071 
0.230  0.094  0.035  0.117 
0.113  0.049  0.013  0.109 
0.117  0.040  0.010  0.112 
0.024  0.034  0.008  0.109 
0.150  0.228  0.025  0.160 
0.194  0.031  0.011  0.113 
0.011  0.077  0.003  0.083 
0.031  0.123  0.054  0.479 
0.036  0.177  0.160  0.125 
0.008  0.061  0.006  0.075 
0.168  0.031  0.011  0.096 
0.040  0.028  0.078  0.122 
a  Only countries  with population  above 500,000  are considered. For Euro 12 members,  comovements are computed in relation  to the other 11 countries.  High- 
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Country  (%)  Trade  VP  VY 
Nicaragua  1168.4  U.S.  U.S.  Euro 
Bolivia  702.4  U.S.  U.S.  U.S. 
Peru  530.7  U.S.  Euro  Euro 
Argentina  430.8  Euro  Euro  Euro 
Brazil  288.4  U.S.  U.S.  Euro 
Chile  106.9  Euro  U.S.  U.S. 
Israel  78.2  Euro  U.S.  Euro 
Uruguay  62.2  Euro  Euro  U.S. / Euro 
Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  48.7  Euro  Euro  Euro 
Mexico  41.0  U.S.  U.S.  Euro / Japan 
Turkey  39.4  Euro  Euro  U.S. 
Ghana  38.7  Euro  U.S.  Euro 
Sierra Leone  34.2  Euro  U.S.  Euro 
Guinea-Bissau  30.5  Euro  Euro  Japan 
Ecuador  25.0  U.S.  U.S.  Euro 
Colombia  22.7  U.S.  U.S.  Euro 
Guyana  22.3  U.S.  U.S.  Euro 
Costa Rica  20.0  U.S.  U.S.  U.S. 
Venezuela  18.5  U.S.  U.S.  Euro 
Paraguay  17.8  Euro  U.S.  Euro 
Nigeria  17.5  Euro  U.S.  Euro 
Jamaica  16.6  U.S.  U.S.  Japan 
Portugal  16.2  Euro  Euro  Euro 
Iran  16.1  Euro  Euro  Euro 
Oman  16.0  Euro  U.S.  Japan 
Greece  15.6  Euro  Euro  Euro 
Dominican  Republic  15.1  U.S.  U.S.  Euro 
Indonesia  15.0  Japan  U.S.  Euro 
The table excludes  countries  with  1997 population  below  500,000 and countries  for which  VP or VY is 
not  available.  Bold  values  apply  if  (1)  highest  trade  share  less  second-highest  trade  exceeds  0.04, 
(2) magnitude  of difference between  lowest  VP and next-lowest  VP exceeds  0.025, or (3) magnitude  of 
difference between  lowest  VY and next-lowest  VY exceeds  0.005. 
Table  13 summarizes  the  information  from  Table  12 by  listing  for each 
of  the  three  criteria  (trade,  price  comovement,  and  output  comovement) 
which  of the three  anchors  is best.  A boldface  entry  means  that the  chosen 
anchor  is  much  superior  to  the  other  two;  a  lightface  entry  means  that 
the  difference  from  at least  one  other  anchor  is  small.  More  specifically, 
a bold  entry  in the  trade  column  means  that  the  highest  trade  share  with 
one  of the  three  potential  anchors  is more  than  4 percentage  points  higher Optimal Currency  Areas * 331 
than that of the second  of the three. In the case of price comovements,  a 
bold  entry means  that the absolute  value  of the difference  between  the 
most  associated  of the three and the second  one is larger that 0.025. For 
the output comovement,  the same definition applies with a cutoff of 0.005. 
These cutoff choices are arbitrary, but the reader, using the data reported 
in  Table  12, can  calculate  another  cutoff.  These  criteria emphasize  the 
choice among  potential  anchors, rather than the choice of whether  to re- 
tain an independent  currency. 
Several interesting  observations  emerge  from Table 13. First, Japan is 
not an attractive anchor for virtually  any of the high-inflation  countries. 
Out of 96 entries in the table, only 8 (which includes one tie) are for Japan. 
No  case has more than one of the criteria in favor of Japan. 
Second, high-inflation Latin American countries are by no means a clear 
dollarization  bloc. In fact, Brazil might be better served  by adopting  the 
euro.  (Although  there is no  clear superiority  in terms of trade or price 
comovements,  the euro performs better in terms of comovement  of out- 
put.) The case of Argentina is interesting: having  one of the highest infla- 
tion rates, this country  seems  to be one  of the best  examples  of a place 
with a high demand  for an external currency anchor. However,  as shown 
in Table 12, Argentina has been largely closed to international trade, and 
its output  and price comovements  are not high with any of the three po- 
tential anchors. So, other than its lack of commitment  ability, Argentina 
does  not appear to be an obvious  member of a currency union  with  the 
euro or the U.S. dollar. In contrast, Mexico and Ecuador look much closer 
to the U.S. dollar  than to the euro.  The same  conclusion  applies  to the 
Dominican  Republic. Nicaragua has low  comovements  with all three an- 
chors, but its exports  go  mostly  to Europe. Hence,  the euro might  be a 
better choice than the U.S. dollar. Chile and Uruguay have higher exports 
to Europe, but they have larger comovements  with  the United  States. 
Third, looking  at countries  at the geographical  boundaries  of Europe, 
in some  cases their natural anchor is the euro: this conclusion  applies  to 
Greece (which  has joined  the euro zone)  and Turkey. Israel might  be a 
good  candidate  for the  euro,  although  it could  also  be  well  served  by 
the U.S. dollar. As for Africa, trade shares are much higher with Europe. 
Comovements  are, however,  just as high with  the United  States. Ghana, 
Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone seem to be natural euro clients, but other 
African countries  are less clear. 
We have measured  lack of ability to commit according to past inflation 
experience.  One  could  also  look  at  institutional  measures  of  potential 
commitment,  such as the degree of central-bank independence.  However, 
although  this measure has some  explanatory  power  for inflation perfor- 332 *  ALESINA,  BARRO,  & TENREYRO 
mance among OECD countries, it does not seem to explain much for de- 
veloping  countries.20 
High-inflation  countries are not the only potential clients of an anchor. 
If a country trades extensively  with a potential anchor, then adopting the 
anchor currency may be a good  strategy even  if the inflation rate under 
autonomy  is low. In Table 14, we report all the countries that have a trade 
share with  at least one of the potential anchors of at least 9% of GDP. In 
the first column  we  report the name  of the anchor that has the highest 
trade share; when  more than one  anchor has a share of at least 9%, we 
report all in decreasing order. For example, if country X's trade share was 
15% of its GDP with the United States and 9% with the Euro 12, the entry 
will read U.S. /Euro.  In the next column, we report the name of the anchor 
with  the highest  comovements  of prices and output, with  the same con- 
vention  as before concerning  the bold entries. 
The first inference from Table 14 is that the countries forming the Euro 
12 area do seem to belong together. The same observation applies to other 
European countries that are not currently members of the Euro 12, such 
as Sweden  and Switzerland.  Second,  African countries  trade more with 
Europe than with  the United  States or Japan, so, by and large, the best 
potential  anchor for Africa is the euro. Note  that the CFA franc zone  is 
already tied  to the euro. Third, Central American countries  trade much 
more with the United States. Fourth, for several East Asian countries, such 
as Hong  Kong and Singapore,  the U.S. dollar appears to be superior to 
the yen as a potential anchor. These Asian countries trade more with the 
United  States than with  Japan and are more closely  associated  with  the 
U.S. business  cycle. Canada is extremely tied to the United States in every 
dimension.21 
Overall, we  find that geographically  connected  currency areas tend to 
emerge with  the U.S. dollar and the euro as the anchor. However,  Japan 
does not emerge as much of an anchor. Putting together the results from 
Table 14 with  those  of Tables 12 and 13, we  draw the following  conclu- 
sions: (1) There seems  to be a fairly clear dollar area including  Canada, 
Mexico, most of Central America, and parts of South America (excluding 
Argentina  and  Brazil).  Farther afield  geographically,  the  dollar  zone 
seems  also to encompass  some Asian countries, such as Hong  Kong and 
Singapore.  (2) The euro area includes  all of western  Europe and most of 
Africa. Argentina might actually be better served by joining the euro area 
than the dollar area. However,  the only reason for Argentina to be seeking 
20. See Alesina and Summers (1993) for OECD country evidence,  and Cukierman (1992) for 
evidence  on developing  countries. 
21. See Buiter (1999) for a discussion  of this point. Optimal Currency  Areas * 333 
Table 14  HIGH-TRADE-SHARE COUNTRIES: BEST ANCHOR  BASED ON 
THE THREE CRITERIA 
Best anchor 
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Table 14  CONTINUED 
Best anchor 
Country  Tradea  VPb  VYb 
Sierra  Leone  Euro  U.S.  Euro 
Singapore  U.S.  /Japan  U.S.  Euro 
Sweden  Euro  Euro  Euro 
Switzerland  Euro  Euro  Euro 
Syrian  Arab Republic  Euro  U.S.  Euro 
Togo  Euro  Euro  Euro 
Trinidad and Tobago  U.S.  U.S.  Euro 
Tunisia  Euro  Euro  Euro 
United  Arab Emirates  Japan  / Euro  U.S.  Euro 
Venezuela,  RB  U.S.  U.S.  Euro 
a The table  excludes  countries  with 1997  population  below 500,000  and countries  for which VP  or VY  is 
not available.  The  best anchor  according  to the trade  criterion  is shown only when the trade  share  exceeds 
9%.  When  there  is more  than  one anchor  country  for  which  the trade  share  exceeds  9%,  we list the  anchors 
in descending  order  of the trade  shares. 
b Bold values apply if the magnitude  of the difference  between the lowest VP and the next-lowest  VP 
exceeds  0.025  or the magnitude  of the difference  between  the lowest VY  and the next-lowest  VY  exceeds 
0.005. 
any anchor is her history of high inflation. (3) There does  not seem to be 
any clear yen area. (4) There are several countries that do not appear in 
Tables  12-14.  These  are countries  with  low  inflation  that do  not  trade 
much with any of the three potential anchors. Primary examples are India, 
Australia, and New  Zealand. 
It is worthwhile  to compare our results briefly with those of Ghosh and 
Wolf (1994), who use a different approach to assess the pros and cons for 
regions  and countries to form currency unions.  They argue that optimal 
currency areas are typically  formed by countries that are geographically 
disconnected.  For example,  they conclude  that Europe and the states of 
the United States are not optimal currency areas. We have not examined 
the U.S. states, but Europe does present a good  case for a currency union 
based  on our examination  of the patterns of trade and comovements  of 
prices and outputs.  More generally, despite  some exceptions,  geographi- 
cal proximity typically fits well with our criteria for currency unions. The 
differences  between  our findings  and those  of Ghosh and Wolf seem  to 
arise because  they  do  not emphasize  the link between  currency unions 
and trade and because  they assume  a very high cost from imperfect syn- 
chronization  of business  cycles. 
Ideally, we  would  go beyond  the simple  criteria thus far advanced  to 
evaluate  the  relative  costs  and  benefits  of  the  trade-off  leading  to  the 
choice  of  currency  adoption.  For example,  should  a  country  such  as Optimal  Currency  Areas  ?  335 
Argentina  with  high  inflation  but  low  comovements  with  the  United 
States and the euro zone remain autonomous  or use the dollar or the euro? 
How  much  can trade benefits  of  a currency  union  compensate  for the 
loss  of monetary  autonomy?  To answer  these  questions,  we  need  more 
quantitative  information  than we  have yet generated. 
6. What  Changes  with Currency  Adoption? 
Thus far, we have discussed  the possible  configuration  of currency areas 
based  on the behavior of inflation, trade, and the comovements  of prices 
and outputs  that prevail  (in most cases) before the creation of a currency 
union.  In choosing  whether  to join a monetary  area, a potential  entrant 
would  have to estimate the values  of trade and comovements  that would 
apply  after the entry. In practice, this calculation is difficult-for  the po- 
tential entrant and also for the econometrician.22 In the next section,  we 
discuss estimates of effects from joining a currency union on international 
trade flows.  Then we  discuss  some  new  estimates  of effects of currency 
union  on trade and on comovements  of prices and outputs. 
6.1 CURRENCY  UNIONS AND INTERNATIONAL  TRADE: 
THE  AVAILABLE  EVIDENCE 
Most of the existing  empirical work on the effects of currency unions  on 
trade flows  has been framed in the context of the standard gravity model. 
According  to this approach, the bilateral trade between  a pair of countries 
is  increasing  in  their  GDPs  and  is  inversely  related  to  their  distance, 
broadly construed to include all factors that create "trade resistance." The 
gravity  equation  is then  augmented  with  a dummy  variable indicating 
whether or not the countries share the same currency. The estimate of the 
coefficient  on this dummy  is interpreted as the currency-union  effect. In 
the seminal paper in this area, Rose (2000) reports that bilateral trade be- 
tween  two  countries  that use the same currency is, controlling  for other 
effects, over 200% larger than bilateral trade between  countries  that use 
different currencies. 
The apparently  large effect of currency unions  on trade is surprising, 
because estimates of the effect of reduced exchange-rate volatility on trade 
are small [see, for example, De Grauwe and Skudelny  (2000), Frankel and 
Wei  (1992), and  Eichengreen  and  Irwin  (1995)]. Moreover,  fees  on cur- 
rency  conversion  are  typically  a  small  percentage  of  total  transaction 
22. Issing  (2001) argues  that one  should  expect  that prices  and  outputs  will  move  more 
closely  together  in the European Union  after the adoption  of the euro. 336 ?  ALESINA,  BARRO,  & TENREYRO 
Table 15  EMPIRICAL  STUDIES  OF THE  EFFECT  OF CURRENCY  UNION 
ON TRADE 
Point estimate of 
increased  trade  from 
Authors  Significancea  currency union 
Rose (2000)  s  240% 
Frankel  and Rose (1998)  s  = 290% 
Engel and Rose (2002)  s  -  240% 
Persson (2001)  ns  -  40% 
Tenreyro  (2001)  ns  60% 
Pakko and Wall (2001)  ns  ~ -55% 
Glick and Rose (2002)  s  -  100% 
Rose and van Wincoop (2001)  s  = 140% 
Rose (2002)  ns, s  -68% to +708% 
Lopez-Cordova  and Meissner  (2001)  s  - 100% 
Levy (2001)  s  =  50% 
Nitsch (2002)  s  = 85% 
Flandreau  and Maurel  (2001)  s  -  220% 
Klein (2002)  s  ~ 50% 
a  = statistically  significantly  different  from  zero, ns = not significant. 
costs.23  On the other hand,  as already discussed,  border effects on trade 
are large, and perhaps these large effects can be explained by the necessity 
to use  different currencies on the two  sides  of a border. 
Numerous  empirical studies,  summarized  in Table 15, have examined 
and extended  Rose's research. Pakko and Wall (2001) focus on time-series 
variation, which  involves  cases in which  currency union is either imple- 
mented  or abandoned.  Their findings reveal a negative,  though  insignifi- 
cant, effect of currency union  on trade. However,  Glick and Rose (2002) 
use  an expanded  panel  data set that includes  more  episodes  of regime 
switching.  With this set, they find large and positive  estimates  from the 
time-series  variation. 
Rose (2002) provides  new  estimates of the effect of currency unions  on 
trade, making  use  of the time-series  as well  as cross-sectional  variation 
in the data. This study  reports a wide  range of estimates,  using  different 
samples  and techniques.  Point estimates  range from a negative,  though 
insignificant, effect of -68%,  using fixed effects in the original sample, to 
a 708% effect using  a matching  sample  technique  and a much  broader 
database. 
Rose and van Wincoop (2001), Nitsch (2002), Melitz (2001), Klein (2002), 
23. The argument  that currency conversion  fees are low may not apply to trade in capital, 
where the currency turnover is extremely high and hence small proportionate costs can 
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and Levy (2001) address problems of aggregation bias, arguing that pool- 
ing different currency unions  may mask differential effects. Yet, all these 
studies  point  toward  a significantly  positive  effect on trade. Thom  and 
Walsh (2002) present a case study on Ireland's break with sterling, finding 
no  significant  effect  on  trade.  Other  studies,  including  Flandreau  and 
Maurel  (2001) and  Lopez-Cordova  and  Meissner  (2001), focus  on  pre- 
W.W. I data. 
The underlying  assumption  in the various empirical studies is that cur- 
rency unions  are randomly  chosen. Standard endogeneity  problems  can, 
however,  confound  the estimates.  For example,  the presence  of currency 
union may encourage  trade, but the presence  or potential for substantial 
trade may  also  stimulate  the formation  of a currency union.  The use  of 
country-pair fixed effects, employed  in some of the studies, may not alle- 
viate  this  simultaneity  problem,  because  a shift  at some  point  in trade 
linkages may be related to the change in the propensity to form a currency 
union. 
Similarly,  the  existence  of a currency  union  may  reflect unmeasured 
characteristics  that  also  influence  the  volume  of  bilateral  international 
trade. The currency-union  dummy  can get credit for the effects of these 
unobserved  variables.  As  examples,  compatibility  in  legal  systems, 
greater cultural links, and tied bilateral transfers may increase the propen- 
sity to form a currency union  as well  as strengthen  trade links between 
two countries. In these cases, the OLS estimate of the currency-union  ef- 
fect on  trade tends  to be biased  upward.  Other omitted  variables  may 
bias OLS estimates  in the opposite  direction. For example,  a higher level 
of monopoly  power  means  higher  markups,  which  tend  to deter trade. 
At the same  time, a greater degree  of monopoly  distortion  may  lead  to 
higher inflation rates under discretion and thereby increase the desire to 
join a currency union  as a commitment  device  to reduce inflation. 
Persson (2001) voices a different critique based on the potential for self- 
selection  in the decision  to form a currency union. Among  other distinc- 
tive features, countries that have been engaged  in currency unions during 
the past decades  are typically  small and poor, tend to be geographically 
close, and are likely to share tight cultural links. Examples are the 15 coun- 
tries of the CFA-franc zone  in Africa, the seven  members  of the Eastern 
Caribbean Currency Area, and the unilaterally dollarized Panama, Puerto 
Rico, and  Bermuda. Systematic  differences  in observable  characteristics 
can distort OLS estimates when  the effect of using the same currency dif- 
fers across groups  or when  there are other types  of nonlinearities  in the 
trade relation  that have  been  ignored.  Using  semiparametric  methods, 
Persson's  study  finds little support  for a currency-union  effect on trade; 
his point estimates,  ranging from 13% to 45%, are not statistically signifi- 338 *  ALESINA,  BARRO,  & TENREYRO 
cantly different from zero. This result is not surprising, however,  because 
the matching procedure-designed  to deal with nonlinearities  in observ- 
able variables-throws  out much of the information in the sample. More- 
over, as already noted, when  Rose (2002) applies  the matching approach 
to a broader data set, he obtains  an enormous  estimate  for the effect of 
currency union  on trade. 
Another concern is a mechanical problem caused by sample  selection. 
Previous  estimates  of the currency-union  effect were based  on a sample 
of countries  with  positive  bilateral trade flows.  Pairs of countries  with 
zero trade flows-typically  pairs of small countries-were  excluded from 
the sample  to satisfy  the log  specification  of the gravity  equation.  This 
issue may be important, because  roughly half of the annual country-pair 
observations  exhibit zero trade. 
6.2 THE  EFFECTS  OF CURRENCY  UNIONS:  NEW RESULTS 
To  address  the  various  estimation  issues,  Tenreyro  (2002) begins  by 
studying  the  empirical  determinants  of  past  and  present  currency 
unions.24 She uses  a probit analysis  for all country pairings from 1960 to 
1997 with  four potential  currency anchors: Australia, France, the United 
Kingdom,  and  the United  States.25  The anchors  used  here  are different 
from the  hypothetical  ones  considered  before  for obvious  reasons:  the 
euro  did  not  exist  before  2002, and  the now  defunct  French franc was 
historically  an  important  anchor  currency.  Interestingly,  the  yen  was 
never  an anchor for anyone. 
The main results, reported in Table 16, are that a currency union with 
one  of  the  four  candidate  anchors  is  more  likely  if  the  client  country 
(1) is closer geographically  to the anchor, (2) has the same  language  as 
the anchor, (3) is a former or current colony  of the anchor, (4) is poorer 
in  terms of per  capita GDP, and  (5) is  smaller  in population  size.  The 
probability is increasing in the per capita GDP of the anchor (among the 
four considered).  Elements that do not matter significantly include island 
or land-locked  status and a common  border with  the potential  anchor. 
Our general idea is to use the estimated  model  for the propensity  of a 
country to enter into a currency union  to form an instrumental  variable 
for the currency-union  dummy.  However,  it does  not  work  to use  the 
estimates  from the probit equation  directly, because  the determinants  of 
the probability of currency union (such as distance and other gravity vari- 
24. Persson (2001) also modeled  the choice of currency union, but he did not use this analysis 
to construct instrumental  variables. 
25. Her analysis, unlike Rose's (2000), treats the CFA countries as in a currency union with 
France. She also departs from Rose in treating the ECCA countries as in a currency union 
with  the United  States since  1976 and with  the United  Kingdom  before that. Optimal Currency  Areas - 339 
Table 16  PROPENSITY TO ADOPT THE CURRENCY OF MAIN ANCHORS 
Marginal 
Std.  effect  at 
Statistic  Coefficient  error  mean 
min(log  per capita GDP in pair)  -0.1586*  0.061  -0.0015 
max(log  per capita GDP in pair)  1.7167*  0.385  0.0163 
min(log  population  in pair)  -0.1352*  0.048  -0.0013 
max(log  population  in pair)  0.2372  0.127  0.0023 
min(log  area in pair)  -0.0546  0.046  -0.0005 
max(log  area in pair)  0.2181*  0.072  0.0021 
Regional-trade-agreement  dummy  -0.8864*  0.277  -0.0032 
log  distance  (km)  -0.8766*  0.143  -0.0083 
Border contiguity  dummy  -1.2398*  0.619  -0.0033 
Landlocked-client  dummy  -0.1522  0.242  -0.0013 
One-island-in-pair  dummy  0.0226  0.240  0.0002 
Two-islands-in-pair  dummy  1.1880*  0.437  0.0512 
Common-language  dummy  0.7487*  0.216  0.0124 
Ex-colony-colonizer  dummy  1.8799*  0.285  0.1369 
Current-colony  (or territory) dummy  0.8491*  0.239  0.0253 
Pseudo  R2  0.473 
Number  of observations  29,564 
Dependent  variable:  currency-union  dummy.  The  sample  consists  of country  pairs  that  include  the four 
candidate  anchors:  Australia,  France,  the United Kingdom  and the United States.  The equations  are for 
annual  data  from  1960  to 1997,  include  year  effects,  and allow for clustering  over time for country  pairs. 
The definition  of currency  union treats  the CFA  franc  countries  as linked  to France  and treats  the ECCA 
countries  as linked to the United States  since 1976  and to the United Kingdom  before 1976.  The mean 
of the currency-union  dummy  for  this  is 0.051.  For  the sample  that  regards  the CFA  countries  as unlinked 
to France  and the ECCA  countries  as unlinked  to the United States  or the United Kingdom,  the mean 
is 0.024.  The last column shows the marginal  effect,  evaluated  at the sample mean,  of each explanatory 
variable  on the estimated  probability  of a currency  union. For dummy variables,  the effect refers  to a 
shift from  zero to one. 
*  Statistically  significant  at 1%  level. 
ables) also enter directly into the determinants of bilateral trading volume. 
Hence,  Tenreyro (2002) adopts  an indirect approach. 
Consider any potential  client country, i, which  is evaluating  the adop- 
tion of a currency with  one of the four anchors considered,  denoted  by 
k =  1, 2, 3, 4. The probit regression determines  the estimated probability, 
p(i, k), of the currency adoption.  This probability depends  on the distance 
between  i and k and the other variables mentioned  above. If the countries 
take their currency-union  decisions  independently,  then the joint proba- 
bility  that i and j use the currency of anchor k will be given  by 
Jk(i j)  =  p(i,  k)p(j,  k). 
Note  that Jk(i,  j) will be high if countries i and j are both close to potential 
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share a common  money  (the U.S. dollar) not because  they  are close  to 
each other, but rather because each is close to the United States, and hence 
each was  independently  motivated  to adopt the U.S. dollar. 
The joint probability that i and j use the same foreign currency (among 
the four candidates considered)  will then be given by the sum of the joint 
probabilities  over the support  of potential  anchors k:26 
4  4 
(i, j)  =  >Jk(i, j)  =  >p(i,  k)p(  j, k) 
k=l  k=l 
One can then use  the variable J(i, j) as an instrument  for the currency- 
union dummy, for example, in equations for bilateral trade between coun- 
tries i and j. The underlying  assumption  for the validity of this instrument 
is that the bilateral trade between  countries  i and j depends  on bilateral 
gravity variables for i and j but not on gravity variables involving  third 
countries, notably those associated  with the potential anchor countries k. 
These gravity variables involving  third countries affect the propensity  of 
countries  i and j to be part of the same currency zone  and thereby influ- 
ence bilateral trade between  i and j through that channel. However,  these 
variables do not (by assumption)  directly influence the bilateral trade be- 
tween  i and j. 
Tenreyro  (2002)  uses  the  new  instrument  for  the  currency-union 
dummy  to estimate  relations  for pairs of countries  for trading volume, 
comovement  of prices, and comovement  of outputs.  We present some of 
these  results  in Table 17, which,  for brevity,  reports only  the estimated 
coefficients  of the currency-union  variable. 
For bilateral trade, the results use annual data from 1960 to 1997 for all 
pairs of countries.  Taking account of data availability,  this system  com- 
prises  over  300,000 observations  (when  we  include  the roughly  half of 
the sample  that has zeros for bilateral trade). The dependent  variable is 
measured  as log(trade  +  positive  constant),  where  the presence  of the 
positive  constant allows  us to include  the zero-trade observations  in the 
regressions.  For the results shown  in Table 17, the constant is set to 100 
1995 U.S. dollars. The system  includes  as independent  variables a set of 
usual  gravity measures-log  of geographical  distance, membership  in a 
regional trade agreement, common language, former and current colonial 
relationship,  common  colonizer,  common  border, and island  and  land- 
locked  status-along  with  the logs  of GDP per capita, population,  and 
26. For a pair of anchors, say, k1  and k2,  the probability is J(kl, k2) =  p(k2,  k2)[1 -  p(kl, k3) 
p(k1,  k4)] +  p(ki, k2)[l -  p(k2,  k3) -  p(k, k,)] +  =3 p(kl, k3)p(k2,  k3). Optimal Currency  Areas * 341 
Table 17  ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS  OF CURRENCY-UNION  DUMMY IN 
VARIOUS SYSTEMS 
Coefficient  (standard  error) 
OLS with  IV with 
System  OLS  country  effects  IV  country  effects 
log(bilateral trade +  100),  0.75  0.91  1.56  2.70 
N =  348,295  (0.20)  (0.18)  (0.44)  (0.44) 
Comovement of prices,  0.0690  0.0456  0.2433  0.0874 
mean =  -0.16,  (0.0058)  (0.0028)  (0.0243)  (0.0080) 
N =  9027 
Comovement of outputs,  0.0029  0.0000  0.0119  -0.0020 
means =  -0.07,  (0.0026)  (0.0011)  (0.0061)  (0.0022) 
N =  7610 
The equations  for bilateral  trade  use annual  data from 1960  to 1997,  include year effects,  and allow for 
clustering  of the error  terms over time for country  pairs. The dependent  variable  is log(trade  +  100), 
where trade  is measured  in 1995  U.S. dollars.  The  value 100  is close to the maximum-likelood  estimate 
of the  constant  in the  expression  log(trade  + constant).  The  explanatory  variables  included,  aside  from  the 
currency-union  dummy,  are log(distance);  dummy variables  for contiguity,  common  language,  colonial 
relationships,  landlocked,  and island;  and the values for  each  country  in the pair  of log(per  capita  GDP), 
log(population),  and log(area).  The definition  of currency  union treats  the CFA  franc  countries  as linked 
to France  and treats  the ECCA  countries  as linked to the United States  since 1976  and to the United 
Kingdom  before 1976.  Country  effects refer to each member  of the pair (not to a country  pair). The 
instrumental  variable  (IV)  systems  include  as an instrument  for the currency-union  dummy  the variable 
described  in the text. The equations  for comovement  include  only one observation  for each pair,  corre- 
sponding  to the period 1960-1997.  The explanatory  variables  then refer  to averages  over time.  Standard 
errors  are in parentheses. 
area for each  country  in a pair.27 The OLS estimates  of the gravity  variables 
are  typically  significant.28 
Table  17  shows  that  the  estimated  coefficient  on  the  currency-union 
dummy  variable  is  0.75  (s.e.  =  0.20)  when  country  fixed  effects  are  ex- 
cluded,  and  0.91  (0.18)  when  country  fixed  effects  (not  country-pair  ef- 
fects)  are  included.  These  results  accord  reasonably  well  with  those 
presented  by  Rose  (2000),  despite  two  major  differences  in  the  ap- 
proaches.  First,  since  he  used  log(trade)  as  the  dependent  variable,  he 
discarded  all of the  zero-trade  observations  (which,  as mentioned,  consti- 
tute  roughly  half  of  the  sample).  Second,  we  defined  the  currency-union 
dummy  more  liberally  than  Rose,  in that  we  treated  the  CFA  franc  coun- 
tries  as in  a union  with  the  French  franc  and  the  ECCA  countries  as  in  a 
union  with  the U.S.  dollar  or the British  pound  (depending  on the period). 
27. See the footnote to Table  17 for the list of independent  variables. 
28. The  error  terms  in the systems  are  allowed to be correlated  over time for a given country 
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The estimated  effect of the currency-union  dummy  variable is larger if 
we  adopt  Rose's more restrictive definition  of a currency union.29 
More interestingly,  the estimated  effects of currency union on bilateral 
trade become  larger when  we  estimate by instrumental  variables, using 
the instrument discussed  before. As shown  in Table 17, the estimated co- 
efficient on the currency-union dummy variable becomes  1.56 (0.44) when 
country  fixed  effects  are  excluded,  and  2.70  (0.44) when  they  are in- 
cluded.30 Hence,  these results support  the argument that currency union 
has an important positive  effect on bilateral trade. Moreover, these instru- 
mental estimates  provide  some  reason to believe  that the causality runs 
from currency union  to trade, rather than the reverse. 
The comovement  of prices is measured by the negative  of the standard 
error VPij  discussed  before. In this case, the sample consists  of one obser- 
vation  (estimated for 1960-1997)  on each country pair for pairs that have 
the necessary  data. We relate this measure  of price comovement  to the 
gravity variables already mentioned  and to various measures  of country 
size  (logs of per capita GDP, population,  and area). Most of the gravity 
variables turn out to be statistically insignificant in the estimates, although 
common  language  and a common  colonial  heritage  are associated  with 
greater price  comovement.  Comovement  also  rises with  the  log  of per 
capita GDP of each country but falls with the log of area of each country. 
Table 17 shows  that the currency-union dummy is significantly positive 
for price comovement,  with an estimated coefficient of 0.069 (s.e. = 0.006) 
when  country fixed effects are excluded,  and 0.046 (0.003) when  they are 
included.  These estimated  effects are substantial relative to the mean of 
the comovement  variable (the negative  of the price-equation standard de- 
viation), which  is  -0.16.  The positive  estimated  effect of currency union 
on  price  comovement  may  emerge  because  currency-union  countries 
avoid  the sometimes  volatile  inflation rates and nominal  exchange  rates 
that  characterize  other  regimes.  The  instrumental  estimates  are  even 
higher  than those  generated  by  OLS. In this case,  the estimated  coeffi- 
cients are 0.24 (0.02) when  country fixed effects are excluded,  and 0.087 
(0.008) when  they are included. 
The comovement  of outputs  is measured  by the negative  of the stan- 
dard error VYij  discussed  before. The sample again comprises  one obser- 
vation  (estimated for 1960-1997)  on each country pair with  the available 
29. The OLS estimates become  1.24 (0.25) without  country fixed effects, and 1.06 (0.23) with 
country fixed effects. 
30. The estimated effects are even larger if we adopt Rose's (2000) more restrictive definition 
of currency unions. In the instrumental estimation,  the estimated coefficients of the cur- 
rency-union  dummy  variable  are then  2.72  (0.75) when  country  fixed  effects  are ex- 
cluded,  and 4.68 (0.79) when  they are included. Optimal Currency  Areas * 343 
data. The explanatory  variables are the same as those used  for price co- 
movements.  The main  effects  from the gravity  variables  turn out  to be 
positive  relationships  with  a common  border, a common  language,  and 
prior and  current colonial  linkages.  However,  Table 17 shows  that the 
estimated  coefficients  on  the currency-union  dummy  variable  are typi- 
cally insignificantly  different from zero. These results may arise because, 
as discussed  before, the theoretical link between  currency union and out- 
put comovement  is ambiguous. 
7. Conclusions 
The basic message  of this paper is twofold.  First, based on the historical 
data on inflation, trade, and comovements  of prices and outputs,  we  ar- 
gued  that there exist well-defined  dollar and euro areas but no clear yen 
area. Second, it is likely that the adoption  of another country's currency 
increases  bilateral trade and raises the comovement  of prices. These re- 
sponses  suggest  that our examination  of the trade patterns and comove- 
ments  that  applied  before  the  adoption  of  a common  currency  would 
underestimate  the potential benefits  from joining  a currency union. 
Several issues  should  be considered  in future empirical research. First, 
the results of the instrumental estimation for the effects of currency union 
need  to be analyzed  more fully. Second, these results can be used to esti- 
mate how  the introduction  of a currency union  would  affect trade and 
the comovements  of prices and outputs  for individual  country pairs un- 
der the hypothetical  adoption of a currency union with a specified anchor 
country.  These results  would  then feed back into our previous  analysis 
of the desirable pattern of world  currency unions.  Third, using  methods 
analogous  to those  used  in this  paper,  we  can assess  the formation  of 
currency unions  that are not linked to a major anchor. For example,  we 
can evaluate  a Latin American currency union or the proposed  unions in 
southern Africa and among  the Persian Gulf states. Fourth, we expect to 
make particular use of the evidence  that accumulates from the experience 
of the European Monetary Union. 
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